The decision to undertake risk is often made in groups, while much of the economics literature on risk taking focuses on the individual. We report the results of controlled laboratory experiments that compare behavior between individuals and pairs. Using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and a within-subject design, we find no evidence of group polarization, but do find significant ordering effects. Pair choices are consistent with a bargaining framework where gender and age impact relative bargaining weights but there is little evidence that conversational leadership or personality does. Finally, the results indicate that pair decisions and partner personality characteristics influence subsequent individual choices.
Introduction
People routinely make decisions under uncertainty due to incomplete information. The perceived degree of uncertainty affects decisions regarding consumption, saving and investing, and the selection of warranties and insurance policies. It also impacts the decision to enter a given profession or engage in certain activities such as crime and extreme sports. Thus it is no surprise that considerable attention has been given to measuring risk attitudes. To this end, researchers have used data from sources ranging from hypothetical responses in large scale surveys (e.g. Barsky et al. (1997) and Dohmen et al. (2005) ) to behavior in high stakes game shows (e.g. Deck et al. (2007) and Baltussen et al. (2008) ).
In the laboratory, researchers can manipulate the decision problem while obtaining complete information about the relevant payoffs and probabilities associated with a given choice.
The truthful revelation mechanism developed by Becker et al. (1963) has been used by numerous researchers to indentify the certainty equivalent of various lotteries. Bids in first price private value auctions have been used to infer risk attitudes (Cox et al. 1988; Harrison, 1990 ). More recently, the simple procedure of Holt and Laury (2002) has received considerable attention (hereafter H&L). In this task, a subject is presented with a series of choices over binary lotteries that vary the chance of winning fixed prizes. The lotteries are constructed in such a way that a person should switch from the safe choice to the risky choice only once and a more risk averse person should switch (weakly) later than a more risk loving person.
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The generally observed pattern is that people tend to exhibit mild risk aversion in the laboratory. However, risk taking research has predominantly focused on choices by individuals, while many naturally occurring decisions are made in groups. For example, spouses may have different individual risk attitudes, but jointly make decisions affecting a range of everyday economic decisions (Mazzocco, 2004) . The current research paper contributes to the small but growing literature on risk taking by small groups by considering the effect of demographic and psychological characteristics on the differences between individual and pair 1 Unfortunately, there is little consistency between implied degrees of risk aversion across different tasks (see Schoemaker (1990) , Isaac and James (2000) , and Berg et al. (2005) ). Deck et al (2009) report evidence suggesting that different elicitation techniques may appeal to different psychological domains of risk as defined by Weber et al. (2002) .
2 Eckel and Grossman (2002) develop a similar tool for measuring risk aversion that holds constant the probability of receiving the larger amount and instead varies the prize amounts. Comparisons of these two mechanisms are mixed (see Dave et al. (2007) and Brunner (2007) ).
choices. The main conclusions from the experimental results are that we observe no evidence of group polarization (the tendency of a group to be more extreme than its members), that gender and age influence bargaining strength, but conversational leadership and personality do not, and that making a pair decision first increases risk taking on subsequent individual choices and that a partner's personality has lasting influence on subsequent private choices.
Previous Research on Risk Taking in Groups
Numerous decisions are made in groups from juries to state legislatures to families to boards of directors. In fact, Kocher et al. (2006) show that people have a preference for making decisions in groups. There is a small but growing literature in experimental economics that studies group decisions making. Cooper and Kagel (2005) find that pairs of subjects are dramatically better at a strategic signaling game. Morgan and Blinder (2005) find that group decisions are superior to and reached as quickly as individual choices in a monetary policy experiments and a statistical urn problem. Cox and Hayes (2006) compare groups and individuals in common value auctions and report that groups are more susceptible to the winner's curse.
There are a few studies specifically related to risk and group decision making. Masclet et al. (2006) use an H&L task to measure risk aversion in individuals and groups of three. They find that groups make fewer safe choices than individuals do and the researchers attribute this to the fact that the most risk averse members of the group tend to concede to the other more risk loving group members. Baker et al. (2007) conduct a similar study with 3 person groups, but report that the groups choose the safe lottery more frequently than do the individual group members. Sheremeta and Zhang (2009) find a similar result with pairs of subjects. Harrison et al. (2005) also conducted group experiments with the H&L procedure.
Rather than the group reaching a decision, each member indicated their own preference for the decision of the group with the majority opinion being implemented. They report that group decisions closely follow that of the individuals in the group. However, Gurdal and Miller (2008) conducted 3 person group experiments with a similar risk measurement tool and found a cautious shift. In their experiment, the safe choice required unanimity to be selected so the group choice is determined by the most risk loving group member. Using willingness to pay data, Shupp and Williams (2008) find that the comparison of groups and individuals varies with the riskiness of the choice: groups are more risk averse with riskier choices and vice versa.
The results of Masclet et al. (2006) are reminiscent of an older literature in psychology on risky shift, which generally observed that groups tend to behave as though they are more risk loving than are the individual members. Wallach et al. (1964) argued that this is due to the sharing of responsibility while Collins and Guetzkow (1964) argue that this is due to risk takers being more confident and persuasive. Group polarization, the result that groups tend to be more extreme than the individuals comprising the group, is the more general phenomenon (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969) . For example, Myers and Bishop (1970) found that students with strong racial prejudices exhibited even greater racial prejudices in a group while the reverse was true for students who did not hold strong racial prejudices. Cason and Mui (1997) explore group polarization in dictator game experiments and find that group behavior tends to resemble the behavior of the more generous members of the group. A relatively recent review of subsequent developments in this literature is provided by Barron and Kerr (2002) .
Experimental Design
The experiments relied upon the H&L risk measurement tool.
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The payoffs, which are five times those of the low payoff baseline in the original study, are shown in Table 1 . In each row, decision makers choose between option A and Option B. The payoffs associated with Option A are always $10.00 and $8.00 and the payoffs associated with Option B are always $19.25 and $0.50. These numbers represent the actual $US payments that the subjects could receive. What varies between rows is the likelihood of receiving the larger amount. In the first row there is a 0% chance, in the second row there is a 10% chance, and so on. Under standard assumptions, an individual who prefers more money to less should prefer Option A in row 1 up to row X and then prefer Option B for row X+1 to row 11 with 1 < X < 11. For a risk neutral person X = 6. A risk averse person would select the safe option more than 6 times and a greater number of safe choices implies a greater degree of risk aversion.
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<< Table 1 Here >> 3 The task is slightly modified by inclusion of the first row in which the outcome is certain to be the lower amount.
4 Because of the coarseness of the instrument, individuals with slight risk aversion or risk preferring preferences would also choose X = 6. For the model of constant relative risk aversion where U (w) = Each subject completed the risk measurement task twice: once individually and once with another randomly selected subject. Some pairs completed the task together before completing the task individually and some pairs completed the task as an individual first.
Subjects knew that they would complete two tasks, but did not know what the second task would be when they were completing their first task. To control for wealth effects, as in H&L, subjects were told that only one row would be randomly selected for payment. Which task (individual or pair) would determine the subject's payoff was determined by a coin flip.
The specific row used for payment was then selected by the roll of a die. Subjects were given the opportunity to inspect the randomization devices prior to making their decisions.
In addition to the two tasks, each subject completed a survey involving demographic information (i.e., age and gender) as well as personality characteristics. Personality characteristics were assessed using Goldberg's (1999) measure of the Big Five personality traits (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness), which is based on the Five Factor Model of personality (Costa and McRae, 1992 ) that has been examined in the psychology literature. We chose this measure of personality because (a) the Five Factor Model is the most popular taxonomy of personality, (b) there is a vast amount of research showing that the Big Five personality traits predict behavioral criteria (see Barrick and Mount, 1991) , and (c) the Big 5 personality traits predict risk taking propensity across a variety of situations and tasks (Gullone and Moore, 2000; Markey et al., 2006) .
5
In each laboratory session, 8 subjects arrived at the lab at the pre-specified time.
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The subjects then drew ID numbers which would determine the task order and their pairings.
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Subjects then proceeded to the lab's computer room where they completed the online survey.
Each station in the computer lab is separated by a system of privacy dividers. After all of the subjects had completed the survey 8 , those in the pair task were taken across the hall to one of the lab's group decision making rooms (a small room with a table that can seat 8 people). These subjects were given directions for the pair task and a scantron form on which to indicate their responses and then left in the room to make their decision. Video 5 A copy of the survey is available upon request. 6 Some sessions were run with 4 or 6 subjects due to other subject's absenteeism. 7 Subjects were not informed at this point that they would be engaging in a pair task nor were they informed as to how their specific ID number would be used. Another advantage of drawing ID numbers is that no identifying information was collected from the subjects that could be connected to their responses, some of which are potentially sensitive. For example, one of the health and safety risk taking items asked the subject if he or she engaged in unprotected sex. 8 Deck et. al (2009) found that there was no difference in behavior in the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure or the survey responses based upon the ordering. and audio recordings were made of the pair interaction. After the pairs completed the task, they returned to the computer lab, sat at separate workstations, received the individual directions and scantrons, and completed the task in private. The subjects who completed the individual task first remained in the computer initially and then moved to one of the lab's group rooms. Copies of the directions for the pair and individual tasks are included in the appendix. After all of the subjects had completed both tasks, each pair privately flipped a coin to determine if the pair or individual task would be used to determine the payoff. If the pair task was selected, the subjects rolled a single 12-sided die to determine which of the 11 rows would be selected where the subjects simply rerolled if the die landed on 12. Finally, a 10 sided die was used to determine the actual payoff that both subjects received. Once the subjects were paid, they were dismissed from the experiment. If the individual task was selected for payment, then each person privately rolled the two die to determine their own payoff before being dismissed.
A total of 102 undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas participated in the experiment. 48 completed the individual task first and 54 completed the pair task first.
The subjects were. Some subjects had participated in previous economics experiments, but none had participated in any studies measuring risk attitudes. The experiments lasted approximately 30 minutes. In addition to the salient earnings, subjects also received $5 participation payment.
Data
The data consist of the H&L choices of 101 individuals and 51 pairs. We exclude one individual since this person (subject id = 19) never selects option B perhaps indicating confusion or a non-monotonic preference, but we keep the person's pair choice which was conducted second. We use the number of safe choices as our measure of risk aversion.
Theoretically, a subject should exhibit a single switching point from preferring the safe lottery to preferring the risky lottery, but it is common for some subjects to not behave consistently (Holt and Laury (2002) and Deck et al. (2009) ). Amazingly, every individual and every pair in our experiment made a single switch. We attribute this to our use of scantron response forms, a format very familiar to the subject pool.
Our data also include demographic and personality information on each individual. There are 99 individuals after excluding two subjects with missing birth years (subject id = 35 and 49). By random assignments, there are 46 subjects who performed the individual task first and 53 who completed the pair task first. There were more males (65%) in our sample. The average age was 22 and the minimum age was 18, while the maximum was 37.
To assess personality, we use a survey instrument that is commonly employed in the psychology literature to measure the Big Five Personality traits, which are described by the Five Factor Model of Personality of Costa and McRae (1992) . The Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality specifies that five traits (i.e., extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness) are fundamental and universal. In particular, there is evidence that the FFM subsumes competing trait models of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Gill and Hodgkinson, 2007) . As such, the FFM is one of the most commonly used personality taxonomies in the management and psychology literatures. Research has consistently shown that the "Big 5" traits are stable across adulthood (McCrae and Costa, 1990) and predict a variety of work-(e.g., task performance, citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction, and training proficiency) and non-work-(e.g., creativity, life satisfaction, smoking, personality disorders, decision-making) related attitudes, behaviors, and phenomena (Malouff et al., 2006; Saulsman and Page, 2004; Barrick and Mount, 1991) . Furthermore, research has shown that the Big 5 traits are related to judgment and decision-making across a variety of contexts, including jury decisions (Clark et al., 2007) , entrepreneurial business ventures (Wooten et al., 1998) , and decisions to engage in risky health-related behaviors (Trobst et al., 2000) .
The Big 5 are purported to effect decision making by influencing confidence/overconfidence in decisions, sensitivity to information from the environment (McElroy and Down, 2007) , and influencing heuristic biases (Trobst et al., 2000) . Consistent with previous research, an established measure of the FFM from the International Personality Item Pool was used to assess the Big 5 personality trait markers (Goldberg, 1999) . To assess the FFM, this measure uses 10 statements to which the respondents can strongly disagree, disagree, be neutral, agree, or strongly agree using a 5 point Likert scale.
For example, statements regarding neuroticism include "I get stressed out easily," "I seldom feel blue" and "I get irritated easily." Participants' responses were averaged to provide a mean score for each of the five personality traits.
Finally, our data include the audio and video recordings of the pair decision making process. While not common in economics, this type of information is commonly studied in other disciplines such as psychology. To transform the recordings into usable data requires a coding process, which identifies the set of possible outcomes (see Bakeman (2000) 
Empirical Results
Before providing a detailed analysis of the results, we first present a graphical summary in The outcome is striking. For 100% of the pairings, the pair choice falls weakly between the individual choices (i.e., none of the markers in Figure 1 lie off of the vertical lines). Thus, contrary to previous studies (Eliaz et al., 2006) , we have no evidence of group polarization, that is in no case was the group choice more extreme than one of the individuals in the pair.
Rather, it appears that a more traditional economic approach of looking at the pair decision as resulting from a bargaining process is appropriate.
<< Figure 1 Here >>
Distribution Analysis
As a first step into the analysis, we explore the distributions of individual and pair choices for the different treatments. The objective is to search for evidence of an ordering effect which would suggest that the behavior observed from those who completed the task individually and then as a pair differs from that perform the tasks in the reverse order. In order to anchor the intuition for expecting differences in behavior, we present a simple conceptual model. Let x * i,p denote the H&L choice revealing true risk aversion of person i randomly assigned to pair p. Let x i,p denote the actual individual choice made by the person. There are four different types of choices that we observe from our experiment: individual choices before or after the pair task and pair choices before or after the individual task. First, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals, when they take the individual task first, will reveal their true risk aversion. That is, x i,p = x * i,p . This assumption hinges on the validity of the H&L method, but is not testable. Second, it is also reasonable to assume that the pair choice is not influenced by whether the individual task is done first or second, as it is determined by a collective decision-making procedure based on two paired people's true risk preferences. In other words, the pair choice should not be different by the ordering of our treatments.
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This is a testable assumption.
• Hypothesis 1: There should be no difference in the distribution of pair choices regardless of whether the pair task is done before or after the individual task.
The remaining question is how individual choices will be influenced by the pair choice when the pair task is done first. To address the question, let us assume that the individual choice made after the pair choice is the weighted average of the person's true choice and the predetermined pair choice. Formally, we write the following equation:
where x p is the preceding pair choice and the parameter α i,p ∈ [0, 1] represents the extent to which the person is influenced by the pair choice. The parameter depends upon not only the person's characteristics but also his or her partner's characteristics. For example, it may be that young people are more likely to be influenced by the pair choice than are older people.
Also people might disregard the preceding pair choice if that choice was dominated by the partner's demand. Thus, in general, the partner's characteristics could matter.
Assume, without loss of generality, that person i is the more risk averse member in the pairing. That is, x * i,p ≥ x * −i,p where the subscript -i represents the partner of subject i. We assume that the pair choice is determined by a Nash bargaining procedure, consistent with the observed behavior shown in Figure 1 . Specifically, we assume that the pair choice is determined by:
where w p ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining weight for the more risk averse member of the pair.
The bargaining model in Equation (2) combined with Equation (1) implies that, when the individual task is completed second, the more risk averse person's observed choice is weakly lower than his true choice, and the less averse person's choice is weakly greater than her true choice. Thus, the variance of observed individual choices after the pair task should be smaller than that of their true choices-those individual choices that would have been made before the pair task. This is testable and forms the basis for:
• Hypothesis 2: The variance of individual choices after the pair task is lower than the variance of individual choices before the pair task. Now let us compare the average of individual choices before and after the pair task in order to test for the ordering effect. Given that there are P pairs, the average of all individual choices after the pair task is the simple average of the pair's average over P pairs:
On the other hand, since individuals reveal their true preferences when the individual task is performed first, the average of all individual choices before the pair task is the following:
To compare the two averages, substitute (2) into (1). Then, the individual choice of person i is:
Likewise, the partner's choice is:
The average of two individual choices of a single pair after the pair task is:
The last line shows that the average of the individual choices after the pair task is the weighted average of their true choices, which forms the basis of Hypothesis 3. Recall that subjects are randomly assigned to the different orderings.
• 
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For our distribution analysis, we look at histograms and implement appropriate statistical tests. First, Figure 2 presents the distributions of the individual choices and pair choices for each treatment. From Panel A, it is clear that subjects who completed the individual task first (left graph) make more safe choices as individuals than those who performed the pair task first (right graph), consistent with Hypothesis 3. This is supported statistically in Table 2 . This means that the relatively more risk-averse person is relatively more influenced by the pair task or that this person has greater bargaining power.
10 Our data on bargaining outcomes confirms this assumption. If we regress x p on x * i,p and x * −i,p for the sample of those who performed the individual task first, then we cannot reject the bargaining weight is equal to 0.5. Table 2 . However, it seems to be true that two distributions are different.
When the individual task is done first choices follow a normal distribution, but when the pair task is done first individual choices do not. For testing Hypothesis 1, the distribution of pair choices, shown in Panel B of Figure 2 , does not differ with respect to their means or variances as shown in Table 2 . Thus, as expected, for the pair task, there is no ordering effect. Table 2 Here >> In sum, the results in this subsection indicate a definite ordering effect and suggest two avenues to be explored. First, how do individuals bargain when forced to make a pair choice? Second, how are subsequent individual choices affected by the pair choice? The former is examined with data from subjects who went through the individual task first and the latter is examined with data from those going through the pair task first.
<<
Before analyzing the order specific treatments, we briefly return to the question of whether pairs behave differently than individuals? Given the clear ordering effect, we rely upon the individual observations for those who did the individual task first and the pair observations for those completing the pair task first (a comparison of the top left and bottom right distributions shown in Figure 2 ). Figure 3 shows the cumulative density functions of the number of safe choices under these two conditions. The figure suggests the distributions of choices are similar across the two treatments for riskier bets, but they differ for safer bets, similar to the results of Shupp and Williams (2008) . However, the differences are not statistically different based upon a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with a p-value of 0.773.
Bargaining Outcomes
We focus on those subjects who performed the individual task first, since their individual choices should represent their true risk aversion (x i,p = x * i,p ). Let us continue to assume that individual i is the more risk averse member of the pair. Under the hypothesis that people do bargain in the pair task, x −i,p ≤ x p ≤ x i,p . We define the pair-specific Nash bargaining weight as the following:
We use this relative weight variable as the dependent variable in a regression that controls for various individual characteristics, with the objective of identifying which characteristics determine the weight that the more risk-averse person carries on the decision of the number of safe choices selected by the pair. In other words, what determines the bargaining power of the more risk averse individual within the pair?
As mentioned in the experimental design, as part of the experiment, we conducted a survey aimed at measuring specific demographic characteristics (e.g., age and gender) and personality traits. We use these variables as explanatory variables of the bargaining process.
Specifically, in the spirit of the literature on collective bargaining models (Browning et al., 1994) , we assume that inter-subject differences in individual characteristics determine the bargaining weight. We specify the following regression:
where u p is the random component of the bargaining weight. ∆Age is the age difference between the more and less risk averse individuals (Age i − Age −i ). ∆Personality represents a vector of the differences in Big Five personality measures (openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism). ∆Conversation is the difference in the measure of conversational leadership constructed from the video recordings. Lastly, GenderComposition is a vector of dummy variables that controls for the gender composition of the pair. There are three dummies: MM for two males, MF for the more risk-averse person being male and the less risk averse person being female, and FM defined in the reverse. The reference group is FF, two female subjects.
The sample we used for this analysis includes 18 pairs who performed the individual task first. Two pairs were dropped for missing values, and three pairs had to be dropped because both people in the pair made the same individual choice, which coincided with the pair choice. When the two individuals have the same preferences, there is no bargaining and the dependent variable is infinite.
The regression results are presented in Table 3 . There are five columns. Columns 1 to 4, use different specifications. The last column implements a placebo test, explained below.
First, we find that two variables, age difference and MM, are robustly significant across specifications. The negative coefficient for age difference provides evidence that the older the more risk averse individual is, the lower will be the weight on the more risk averse person's preferences. The negative sign and the statistical significance of the gender composition variable for MM groups suggests that the bargaining power of the more risk averse subject is reduced when both partners are male, indicating a peer pressure effect between males.
Contrary to our expectations based upon previous literature, the control for conversational leadership, visually exhibited during the bargaining process, turns out to be insignificant in all regressions. In fact, none of the coded behaviors was significant.
None of the Big 5 personality traits demonstrated statistically significant effects, when these are all included in the regression as in Column 2 of Table 3 . We also tried alternative specifications in which each of the personality traits is included in the regression individually.
It is found that only the neuroticism variable had a statistically significant effect. The results presented in Columns 3 and 4 show that difference in neuroticism has a negative and statistically significant effect on the weight that the more risk averse individual carries on the pair choice. This result is intuitive as individuals who score higher on neuroticism tend to be more anxious, experience a higher feeling of guilt, and tend to perform poorly in stressful environments.
<< Table 3 Here >> The last column of Table 3 tests for the validity of our bargaining model. Specifically, we use those groups who performed the pair task first and the individual task second. For these pairs, the bargaining weights created based on observed individual choices should be tainted with the ordering effect. This can be shown using our model. As we assumed in Equation (1), suppose that individual choices made after the pair task are influenced by the pair choice (which we will test in the following subsection). Then, for those pairs who performed the pair task first, the bargaining weight is
This fictitious bargaining weight is constructed based on the individual choices that are influenced by the preceding pair choice (not true individual choices). The last inequality means that the pseudo bargaining weight should deviate from the true bargaining weight
The results in Column 5 of Table 3 show that all the variables included 11 In fact, α i,p and α −i,p are likely to be negatively correlated because the group choice is made by bargaining where it is likely that one person wins and the other person loses.
in the analysis lack explanatory power. There is also a significant drop in the R-squared, which suggests our model is valid.
Influence of Pair Choice on Individual Choice
In the previous subsection, we found evidence of an ordering effect. In this subsection, we attempt to explain how the preceding pair choice influences the subsequent individual choice. First, we examine what affects the likelihood that a person will deviate from the pair choice when making a subsequent individual choice. For this purpose, we construct a dummy variable, Follow, that takes the value of one if the individual choice coincides with the group choice, and zero otherwise and the estimate the following Probit regression:
where F is the standard normal c.d.f. and, as before, x p denotes the decision of individual i's pair. The pair choice is included in order to control for initial conditions for each individual.
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<< Table 4 Here >> In Table 4 , we find that agreeable individuals are more likely to deviate from the pair choice. This is probably because they sacrificed their individual preferences when participating in the pair choice. We find that extroverted individuals are also more likely to deviate from the pair choice. Lastly, we find that the likelihood of males deviating is significantly higher when they are paired with a female.
To further investigate whether the pair choice influences the individual choices when the pair task precedes the individual task, we ideally want to estimate Equation (1). However, this is not possible because we do not observe the true choice. Thus, instead, we estimate the following reduced-form equation:
12 Due to the structure of the task there is an upper bound on the number of safe choices. The bargaining framework creates a lower bound on the number of safe choices for the more risk averse person. Therefore, the more risk averse individual has less room to deviate from the pair choice the more safe choices the pair made. The same effect would restrict the more risk loving person's ability to deviate from the pair if the pair made few safe choices suggesting x p should enter Equation (6) nonlinearly; however, none of our pair observations is close to the lower boundary.
where X i,p is the vector of individual i's characteristics including demographic characteristics, conversational leadership, and Big Five personality traits. X −i,p is a similar vector of the partner's characteristics.
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In Equation (1), which specifies the individual choice after the pair task, the individual choice depends on the predetermined pair choice (x p ), one's true choice, and α i,p . The last parameter is likely to depend on individual characteristics of one's own and the partner's.
14 Lastly, v i,p is the error term. Equation (7) is useful for testing the hypothesis that the predetermined pair choice influences the subsequent individual choice. In terms of Equation (1), we want to test if α i,p = 0.
Suppose that the individual choice is not affected by the pair choice. In this case, the individual choice should be the true choice regardless of the treatment ordering. Since the true choice is based on one's own risk preference, this means that the partner's characteristics should not affect the individual choice.
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Under the hypothesis, the estimates for δ 3 's should be jointly insignificant.
First, we estimate Equation (7) by OLS. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering by pairs. Second, we also estimate the equation after including the pair fixed effects. In this case, we assume that v i,p = a p + ε i,p where a p represents the pair specific effects and ε i,p is the error term. The regression sample includes 52 subjects. One additional observation had to be dropped because of the partner's missing birth year. Table 5 presents regression results. There are five columns which employ different specifications and different samples. In Column 1, we include only the subject's own demographic and personality characteristics. In Column 2, we add the predetermined pair choice. Column 3 includes the partner's characteristics as well as the measure of conversational leadership observed from video recording. In Column 4, we include the pair fixed effects. In the last column, we implement a specification test which is based on a similar idea to the placebo test in Table 3 . Table 5 Here >> 13 Unlike the estimation in Table 2 , which relies upon difference in personality characteristics to determine group outcome, the estimation in Table 4 requires each individual personality scores to determine the influence of one's partner controlling for one's own personality.
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14 One might include interaction terms between the pair choice and individual characteristics because the pair choice and the pair choice influence factor are included in Equation (1) in the multiplicative form. Even if we include all possible interaction terms, the results below are qualitatively the same.
15 It is still likely that the pair choice might be significant when we estimate Equation (7). This is because the pair choice also reflects the true choice. characteristics in Column 3. It turns out that the variables are strongly jointly significant (p-value = 0.005). In particular, the findings show that the partner's personality matters.
The partner's extraversion is significant for one's individual choice after the pair choice. Also, openness and neuroticism turn out to be marginally significant (p-value < 0.1). Column 4 controls for pair fixed effects and the results are similar as those in Column 3. These results provide strong evidence that the preceding pair choice influences the individual choice.
The findings do not hold in the last column, where we use those individuals who performed the individual task ahead of the pair task. For these people, the pair choice should not influence the individual choice in the way implied by Equation (1). On the contrary, the pair choice is the consequence of a bargaining process, which is governed by the bargaining weight. That is,
Since the dependent variable in Column 5 is one's true choice (x * i,p ), the results that are statistically significant should originate from the reverse of the bargaining model, that is: Some other findings in Table 5 are worth noting. First, we find that it is difficult to explain one's individual choice after the pair choice by one's own characteristics only. In
Column 1, all characteristics except openness are insignificant. Second, in Column 3, it is difficult to interpret why a certain personality trait has a positive or negative effect. This is because our estimation equation is not a structural equation which identifies determinants for one's choice. For instance, we find that one's conscientiousness has a significant effect on the individual choice. However, we do not know if that personality matters because it affects one's psychological tendency to follow the preceding pair choice or because it affects one's bargaining power. It is also possible that personality directly affects the degree of one's risk aversion. But it is interesting to note that the partner's personality traits have the opposite signs except for openness, implying that when two people with different personalities form a pair, the collective choice affects their later individual decisions in different ways. Third, we find that, although it is again difficult to interpret the direction of the effect, one's conversational leadership in bargaining does affect the individual choice.
Conclusions
Many risky decisions are undertaken by pairs, but relatively few studies have systematically looked at jointly made choices. Studies that have considered pairs or small groups have primarily been focused on determining if group choices differ from individual choices. The results have been mixed in terms of risk tolerance and seem to suggest that the decision structure (negotiation, voting, etc.) may matter. Our research focuses on negotiation, which is common in many naturally occurring settings, and goes a step further by considering how an individual's demographic and personality characteristics affect her bargaining weight and her willingness to deviate from the group.
We use the common risk attitude elicitation tool of Holt and Laury (2002) with prizes ranging from $0.50 to $19.25 to directly compare the risk taking behavior of individuals and pairs. Our subjects completed the task twice, once individually and once in a pair with the order determined randomly. We find no difference in the number of safe choices made by individuals and pairs, when only considering subjects' initial task, which constitutes a between-subjects comparison. However, we find significant ordering effects. The behavior of pairs does not depend on the task order, but subjects who had previously made decisions in a pair took on more risk individually than those individuals who had not.
Our design also allows us to make within-subject comparisons. We find no evidence of group polarization. That is, pair choices are not more extreme (in either direction) than the most extreme individual in the group. Instead, pair behavior appears to be characterized by the standard Nash bargaining problem as all of our pairs made choices that were convex combinations of the members' preceding individual choices. We find clear evidence that bargaining weight is dependent upon relative age and gender composition. The relatively older the more risk averse person is, the less bargaining power the person will have, suggesting that the younger person drives risk-taking behavior. The more risk-averse person has less power in all male pairs suggesting that male groups are less cautious, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that the more neurotic a person is the less bargaining weight the person will have. These results suggest that group outcomes are affected by a myriad of details and not simply the result of some social choice function applied to individual preferences.
However, we find no support for the conjecture from psychology that those people who lead the conversation are more influential.
We also find that individual behavior is influenced by previous pair decisions and the personality characteristics of one's previous partner. We find evidence to support the conjecture that an individual's choice after making the pair decision is a weighted average of the pair choice and the choice the person would have made had he never made the pair decision. More conscientiousness people and people with more extroverted partners put relatively more weight on the previous pair choice. Further, we find that more agreeable and extroverted people are less likely to simply follow the pair choice as are males who were paired with females. These results are interesting in that they suggest behavior in what seems like a task that should reveal one's "true preference" can be easily influenced by factors not typically considered germane to the task. Thus, this paper also adds to a growing literature on how personality affects economic decision making. More broadly, our results demonstrate the need to consider not only "individual" versus "group" behavioral outcome, but also within-group dynamics and how personalities affect economic choices. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] Notes: In Columns 1 to 4, the sample includes 52 individuals who performed the pair task first. In Column 5, the sample includes 46 individuals who performed the individual task first. Adjusted R squared is reported except Column 1 where R squared is reported. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by pairs, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
